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Understanding mental processes in biological terms makes available insights from the new science of
the mind to explore connections between philosophy, psychology, the social sciences, the humanities,
and studies of disorders of mind. In this Perspective we examine how these linkages might be forged and
how the new science of the mind might serve as an inspiration for further exploration.Ever since Socrates and Plato first speculated on the nature of
the human mind, serious thinkers have sought to understand
themselves and human behavior in general. For earlier genera-
tions, that quest was restricted to the intellectual framework of
philosophy. In the late twentieth century, however, a school of
philosophy concerned with the human mind merged with cogni-
tive psychology, the science of the mind; both then merged
with neuroscience, the science of the brain. The result was a
new, biological science of the mind. The guiding principle of
this new science is that mind is a set of processes carried out
by the brain, an astonishingly complex computational device
that constructs our perception of the external world, fixes our
attention, and controls our actions. Many people—including pol-
icy makers—are beginning to realize that the central challenge
confronting science in the twenty-first century is a better under-
standing of the human mind in biological terms.
Two world leaders have already responded to this challenge.
Shimon Peres, the president of Israel, announced at the 2013
World Economic Forum that the lack of a firm biological
understanding of the human mind is one of the great problems
confronting the world. He initiated the million-dollar Global
B.R.A.I.N. Prize for breakthroughs in brain science that translate
into treatments of brain disorders. In his 2013 State of the Union
address, President Barack Obama independently boosted brain
science with the announcement of a massive, multibillion-dollar
public and private initiative to understand the human brain. In
years to come, this BRAIN initiative may provide a scientific
basis for understanding all brain disorders—not just psychiatric
disorders, but neurological disorders as well, especially Alz-
heimer’s disease, Huntington’s disease, and amyotrophic lateral
sclerosis.
The opportunity to understand our mind in biological terms
opens up the possibility of using insights from the new science
of the mind to explore new linkages with philosophy, the social
sciences, the humanities, and studies of disorders of mind. My
purpose in this Perspective is to examine how these linkages
might be forged and how the new science of the mind might
serve as a font of new knowledge. I describe four interrelated546 Neuron 80, October 30, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.and potentially fruitful points of contact where the new science
of the mind is well positioned to enrich our understanding of
another area of knowledge and, in turn, be inspired to explore
further aspects of mental functioning.
d Neuroscience Links to the Humanities, Philosophy, and
Psychology: Conscious and Unconscious Perception
and Unconscious Instinctive Behavior
d Neuroscience Links to the Social Sciences, Ethics,
and Public Policy: Free Will, Personal Responsibility, and
Decision Making
d Neuroscience Links to the Perception of Art: The Be-
holder’s Share
d Neuroscience Links to Disorders of Mind: Psychiatry,
Psychoanalysis, and Psychotherapy
These four points of contact are likely to give us not only
particular insights into specific areas of the social sciences
and humanities, but also into new approaches to understanding
conscious mental processes. Along the way, we may be sur-
prised to find that biologists have learned the importance of
unconscious processes in our mental life—not just our instinc-
tual life, but also aspects of our free will, personal responsibility,
and decision making.Neuroscience Links to the Humanities, Philosophy, and
Psychology: Conscious and Unconscious Perception
and Unconscious Instinctive Behavior
The unity of consciousness—our sense of self—is the greatest
remaining mystery of the brain. As a philosophical concept, con-
sciousness continues to defy consensus, but most people who
study it think of it as different states in different contexts, not
as a unitary function of mind. One of the most surprising insights
to emerge from the modern study of states of consciousness is
that Freud was right: unconscious mental processes pervade
conscious thought; moreover, not all unconscious mental pro-
cesses are the same. Freud (see Gay, 1995) initially defined the
instinctual unconscious as a single entity consisting largely of
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ories that lie outside consciousness yet influence our behavior
and our experience (for a modern discussion see Alberini et al.,
2013). He later added the preconscious unconscious (now called
the adaptive unconscious), which is part of the ego and pro-
cesses information without our being aware of it.
Thus Freud appreciated that a great portion of our higher
cognitive processing occurs unconsciously, without awareness
and without the capacity to reflect. When we look at a person’s
face, we don’t consciously analyze its features and say, ‘‘Ah, yes,
that’s so-and-so.’’ Recognition just comes to us. Similarly, we
do not consciously form grammatical structures. It’s all done
unconsciously—we just speak. Recently, several psychoana-
lysts (Shevrin and Fritzler, 1968) and neuroscientists (Edelman,
1989, 2004; Koch, 2004; Damasio, 2012; Ramachandran,
2004; Shadlen and Kiani, 2011; Dehaene, 2014) have attempted
to define different states of consciousness operationally, to
make them amenable to experimentation. One approach has
been outlined by Shadlen and Kiani (2011), who argue that
awareness and subjective aspects of perception and volition
are interrelated. They advance the idea that the neural mecha-
nisms that give rise to conscious states share features with
the neural mechanisms that underlie simpler forms of decision
making, designed to engage with the environment.
Dehaene, who uses brain imaging to study a mental pro-
cess that parallels the adaptive unconscious, takes another
approach. He distinguishes a minimum of three states of con-
sciousness: (1) the state of wakefulness—awakening from sleep;
(2) the state of attention—processing a specific piece of informa-
tion without necessarily being aware of it, such as feeling hungry
or seeing a friend; and (3) the state of perceptual awareness
(authorship) and reportable consciousness—becoming aware
of some of the information we pay attention to and being able
to tell others about it (Dehaene, 2014). The second state—atten-
tion—is a transitional state between wakefulness and reportable
consciousness. Dehaene holds that our experience of con-
sciousness is based on these three independent but overlapping
states. The three states presumably reflect different biological
processes, and since wakefulness is essential for both process-
ing information and reportable consciousness, the processes
presumably interact. Dehaene argues that only reportable con-
sciousness corresponds to the idea of consciousness discussed
by philosophers in the past.
The State of Wakefulness
Until relatively recently, wakefulness—arousal and vigilance—
was considered to result from sensory input to the cerebral
cortex: when sensory input is turned off, we fall asleep. In 1949
Giuseppe Moruzzi, an Italian scientist, and Horace Magoun, an
American physiologist, found in experiments with animals that
severing the neural circuits that run from the sensory systems
to the brain in no way interferes with consciousness, the wakeful
state; however, damaging a region of the upper brain stem
known as the wakefulness center produces coma (Moruzzi and
Magoun, 1949). Moreover, stimulating that region will awaken
an animal from sleep. Moruzzi and Magoun thus discovered
that the brain contains a neural system that carries the informa-
tion necessary for the conscious state from the brain stem and
midbrain to the thalamus, and from the thalamus to the cortex.Their work opened up the empirical study not only of conscious-
ness and coma, but also of sleep, thus linking brain science and
psychology to sleep and wakefulness.
PsychologyMeets Neuroscience: The Global Workspace
In 1980 the cognitive psychologist Bernard Baars introduced the
Global Workspace Theory. According to this theory, conscious-
ness (attention and awareness) involves the widespread broad-
casting of previously unconscious information throughout the
brain (Baars, 1997). The global workspace comprises the system
of neural circuits that transmits this information from the brain
stem to the thalamus and from there to the cerebral cortex.
Before Baars wroteACognitive Theory of Consciousness (Baars,
1988), the question of consciousness was not considered a
scientifically worthy problem by most psychologists. We now
realize that brain science has a number of techniques for exam-
ining consciousness in the laboratory. Basically, experimenters
can take any one of a variety of stimuli, such as an image of a
face or a word, change the conditions a bit, and make our
perception of that stimulus come into and go out of conscious-
ness at will. This biological approach to consciousness is based
on a synthesis of the psychology of conscious perception and
the brain science of neural circuits broadcasting information
throughout the brain. The two are inseparable. Without a good
psychology of the conscious state, we can’t make progress in
the biology, and without the biology we will never understand
the underlying mechanism of consciousness. This is the new
science of the mind in action.
Imaging the Global Neural Workspace
Dehaene extended Baars’s psychological model to the brain
(for earlier psychological studies using a paradigm similar to
Dehaene’s, see for example Shevrin and Fritzler, 1968). He found
that what we experience and report as a conscious state is
accompanied by activity in a set of widely distributed neural cir-
cuits; these circuits select a piece of information, amplify it, and
broadcast it forward to the cortex. Baars’s theory andDehaene’s
findings show us that we have two different ways of thinking
about things: one is an unconscious process; the other is
conscious.
The major difficulty in trying to image aspects of conscious-
ness in the brain has been to find experimental methods that
would enable us to contrast unconscious and conscious pro-
cessing. Dehaene found a way to do it. He flashes the words
‘‘one,’’ ‘‘two,’’ ‘‘three,’’ ‘‘four’’ on a screen. Even when he flashes
them very quickly, you can see them. But when he flashes a
shape just before and just after the last word, ‘‘four,’’ the word
seems to disappear. The shape masks the word. The word is still
there on the screen, it is still there on your retina, your brain is
processing it—but you are not conscious of it. Going a bit further,
Dehaene places the words just at the threshold of conscious-
ness, so that half of the time you will say you saw them, and
half of the time you will say you didn’t see them. The objective
reality of the words is exactly the same whether you think you
saw them or not.
Dehaene then asked, ‘‘What happens when we see a sublim-
inal word?’’ He found that first the visual cortex becomes very
active. This is a correlate of unconscious activity: the word we
have seen has reached the early visual processing station of
the cerebral cortex. After 200 or 300 ms, however, the activityNeuron 80, October 30, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 547
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was surprising. Thirty years ago, if asked whether an uncon-
scious perception could reach the cerebral cortex, neuroscien-
tists would have said no, only conscious information reaches
the cortex.
Something quite different occurs when a perception becomes
conscious and reportable, Dehaene found. Conscious percep-
tion also begins with activity in the visual cortex, but instead
of dying out, the activity is amplified. After about 300 ms, it
becomes very large, like a tsunami instead of a dying wave. It
reaches higher into the brain, up to the prefrontal cortex. From
there it goes back to where it started, creating reverberations.
This is the broadcasting of information that occurs when we
are conscious. It moves information, Dehaene argues, into the
global workspace, where it can be accessed by neural functions
in other regions of the brain. In psychological terms, what hap-
pens when we are conscious is that information becomes avail-
able in this larger system, which is detached from our perception
of the actual word. The word is flashed only briefly, but we can
keep it in mind with our working memory and broadcast it to all
areas of the brain that need it. Thus, we can say that conscious
information is globally broadcast information; it is globally avail-
able in the brain. This mechanism has proven to apply to other
sensory stimuli as well. Since we can only focus our attention
on one piece of sensory information at a time, Dehaene argues
that reportable consciousness evolved to enable us to keep
that information active and route it to other areas of the brain.
These areas include the prefrontal cortex, which is involved in
decision making; the temporal lobe, which is necessary for
explicit memory; and the language areas involved in reporting
conscious experiences, where they can be evaluated, memo-
rized, or used to plan the future (Dehaene, 2014). As these argu-
ments make clear, we have various forms of consciousness that
play specific roles in our mental life. We are beginning to under-
stand some aspects of the biological functions of these forms, as
well as the biological necessity for them.
Biological Perspective on Consciousness Studies
The broadcasting of unconscious information to the global work-
space represents some aspects of consciousness, but other
aspects may not be that simple. In other words, not all of the in-
formation broadcast to the cortex in response to a sensory stim-
ulus results in our becoming consciously aware of that stimulus.
How do we distinguish between something that is correlated
with conscious activity (the neural correlate of consciousness)
and something that actually causes conscious activity? To prove
that a state of the brain truly causes a state of mind, we need to
perturb the brain and show that it changes the mind. Daniel Salz-
man and William Newsome of Stanford University (Salzman
et al., 1992; Salzman and Newsome, 1994) have done this using
electrical stimulation to manipulate the information-processing
pathways in the brain of animals. The animals are asked whether
dots on a screen are moving to the left or to the right. By stimu-
lating just a tiny bit of the brain area that is concerned with visual
movement, Salzman and Newsome can induce a slight change
in the animals’ perception of which way the dots are moving.
This change in perception causes the animals to change their
minds about which way the dots are moving. In parallel work,
Logothetis and Schall (1989) have examined binocular rivalry,548 Neuron 80, October 30, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.in which one image is presented to one eye and a very different
image is presented to the other eye. Instead of the two images
being superimposed, the viewer’s perception flips from one
image to the other. In their experiments, Logothetis and Schall
train animals to ‘‘report’’ these flips. They found that some neu-
rons respond only to the physical image, while others respond to
the animal’s perception of it. Their study has spawned other
work, the gist of which is that the number of neurons attuned
to percepts becomes greater as wemove from the primary visual
cortex to higher regions of the brain. These experiments explore
some core aspects of the mind-brain problem. Although we are
only beginning to study the biology of consciousness, we now
have a few useful paradigms for exploring different states of
consciousness.
Unconscious Mental Processes
The experiments described above demonstrate that information
can enter our cortex yet not give rise to conscious perception.
Intriguingly, however, such information can affect our behavior.
Unconscious processing can take place simultaneously in
many different areas of the cortex. The mere recognition of a
word can occur unconsciously, while the meaning of that word
can be accessed at much higher levels in the brain without our
being aware of it. Other aspects of the word can also be
computed unconsciously, such as its sound, its emotional con-
tent, or whether you spoke it in error and want to catch the error.
Ever since the nineteenth-century German physiologist and
psychologist Hermann von Helmholtz first discovered uncon-
scious processing, scientists have been struggling to under-
stand how it works and how deep it can go (Meulders, 2010).
von Helmholtz realized that the brain is creative: it automatically
(unconsciously) assembles basic bits of information from the
sensory systems and draws inferences from them. In fact, the
brain can make complex inferences from very scant information.
When you look at a series of black lines, for instance, the lines
don’t mean anything; but if the lines begin to move—and partic-
ularly if theymove forward—your brain instantly recognizes them
as a personwalking. Helmholtz understood that the unconscious
brain can take partial information, compare it to previous expe-
rience, and make a learned, rational judgment. This was an
amazing insight.
In 1939 Heinz Hartmann dramatically expanded our under-
standing of Freud’s preconscious unconscious in an essay
entitled ‘‘Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation’’ (Hart-
mann, 1964). He developed the idea that the ego has innate
abilities, many of which are unconscious and facilitate our ability
to adapt to the environment. Recently, scientists have recog-
nized this higher level of unconscious thinking.
The Adaptive Unconscious
Timothy Wilson, a cognitive psychologist, has now expanded
on Freud’s and Hartmann’s view and introduced the idea of
the adaptive unconscious, a set of unconscious processes that
serves a number of functions; one of them is decision making
(see also Dijksterhuis and Nordgren, 2006). For many years,
behavioral researchers have been trying to tease apart the
conscious and unconscious components of our everyday judg-
ments and decisions. They have documented that our mind
has two ways of thinking: the slow, deliberate, conscious pro-
cess and a faster, adaptive unconscious. While we consciously
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lets part of our mind keep track of what’s going on elsewhere, to
make sure we aren’t missing something important.
Many of us, when faced with an important choice, make a list
of pluses and minuses to help us decide what to do. But exper-
iments have shown that this may not be the best way to make a
decision. Instead, we should gather as much information as
possible unconsciously. A preference will bubble up. If we are
overly conscious, we may talk ourselves into thinking that we
prefer something we really don’t. Sleeping helps equilibrate
emotions, so when it comes to an important decision, we should
literally sleep on it (see for example Nordgren et al., 2011).The
adaptive unconscious is vital to our survival. It works in tandem
with consciousness to guide us in ways that make us the smart-
est species on Earth. And since we have evolved two different
kinds of mental processes to deal with different kinds of mental
information, it would be interesting to see how far back they go in
evolution.
Interplay of Conscious and Unconscious Mental
Processes
As we will see in the discussions that follow, almost every mental
function requires the interplay of conscious and unconscious
processes. Thus, for example, the biology of conscious and
unconscious processes could provide an important new link
between psychoanalytic theory and the modern science of the
mind. Such a link would enable us to explore, modify, and, where
appropriate, disprove psychoanalytic theories about the uncon-
scious. For its part, the new science of the mind might well be
enriched by psychoanalytic ideas. Using Dehaene’s operational
approach, we might explore how Freud’s instinctual uncon-
sciousmaps ontomodern biological insights into social behavior
and aggression. Do these unconscious processes reach the
cerebral cortex, even though they may not reach conscious-
ness? What neural systems govern mechanisms of defense,
such as sublimation, repression, and distortion?
Creativity has been described as the recruitment of uncon-
scious thought and its ability to find new combinations and per-
mutation of ideas. The description was formalized in the 1950s
by Ernst Kris (Kris, 1952), an art historian and psychoanalyst.
According to Kris, creative people have moments in which they
experience, in a controlled fashion, a relatively unrestricted and
easy communication between unconscious and conscious
mental processes. He called this communication ‘‘regression in
the service of the ego.’’ By regressing in a controlled manner,
as opposed to the uncontrolled regression of a psychotic
episode, an artist can bring the force of unconscious drives
and desires into the forefront of his or her images. Cognitive
psychological studies of creativity are generally consistent with
Kris’s view, but we know very little about the biology of creativity.
Following the discovery that language is represented in the left
hemisphere of the brain, John Hughlings Jackson, the founder
of British neurology, argued that the left hemisphere is special-
ized for analytical organization, whereas the right hemisphere
is specialized for associating stimuli and responses and thus
for bringing new combinations of ideas into association with
each another.
Recent studies by Jung-Beeman and Kounios (Jung-Beeman
et al., 2004) are consistent with this idea. The researcherspresented study participants with simple problems that could
be solved either by a flash of insight or by systematic thought.
Using brain imaging, Jung-Beeman and Kounios found that a
region of the right temporal lobe, the anterior superior temporal
sulcus, became particularly active when participants experi-
enced a flash of insight. The same region was also active during
their initial effort to solve the problem, which indicates that the
creative insight may have enabled them to see connections
between ideas. The evolving biology of conscious and uncon-
scious mental processes will eventually influence many human
endeavors, from mathematical thinking and computer science
to creativity in arts and science, from evaluation of child-rearing
practices to judgments of guilt and innocence in the courtroom,
and from normal social behavior to disorders of behavior—many
of which involve disorders of conscious and unconscious mental
processes.
Emotion and the Instinctive Unconscious
Emotions are behaviors that are associated with internal
(instinctive) states such as sex, aggression, and fear, all of which
have important unconscious components, as Freud pointed out.
Recently, we have gained new insights into the brain mecha-
nisms that are responsible for behavioral states, including the
paradox of sex and aggression. Usually, these two instinctive
drives are mutually exclusive, but under some circumstances
they reinforce each other, as we shall see. In the last several
decades, neuroscience has opened new windows onto the
molecular biology of social behavior. The resulting insights are
likely to stimulate thinking in sociology and promise new ap-
proaches to understanding empathy, aggression, pair bonding,
promiscuity, and other social issues.
The Nature of Social Affiliation
Cori Bargmann at Rockefeller University has shown that the
two strains of the worm C. elegans forage for food in different
ways (de Bono and Bargmann, 1998). Members of one strain
are loners: they go out by themselves and gather bacteria, the
source of their food. Members of the other strain forage collec-
tively. Bargmann traced this difference in behavior to a variation
in the gene that codes for a particular neuropeptide—specif-
ically, to a difference in one amino acid. Eventually, Bargmann
and her colleagues discovered that feeding behavior is
controlled by a pair of neurons. These neurons collect informa-
tion on the immediate environment that is funneled to them
from various sensory neurons. When the environment is condu-
cive to collective feeding, the neurons send ‘‘let’s get together’’
signals to the animals’ motor systems and muscles, and collec-
tive feeding is initiated. But when a particular variant of a partic-
ular gene is active, information about the environment cannot
reach the neurons, and the animals remain solitary. These obser-
vations give us some insight into how a nervous system creates
behavior—and that is our goal in studying the social brain.
Tom Insel, while at Emory University, discovered an evenmore
dramatic difference in the behavior of two species of voles, a
small rodent (Insel and Fernald, 2004). Prairie voles are highly
social animals that form permanent pair-bonds. Montane voles,
in contrast, are somewhat asocial but promiscuous in their mat-
ing. This difference in behavior is caused by a variation in the
gene that codes for two particular peptides, oxytocin and vaso-
pressin. Insel later inserted an oxytocin gene into asocial mice,Neuron 80, October 30, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 549
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role in mammalian reproductive and social behavior, including
our own. For example, Thomas Baumgartner and his colleagues
at the University of Zurich found that oxytocin squirted into a per-
son’s nose can enhance the sense of trust (Baumgartner et al.,
2008). It does so by acting on the amygdala and the midbrain,
two regions involved in fear, and the dorsal striatum, a region
involved in behavioral feedback. Oxytocin appears to produce
a different effect when administered to people with borderline
personality disorder: it impedes trust and positive social
behavior. Scientists have argued that the link between oxytocin
and serotonin may be different in people with this disorder, who
suffer from social anxiety and sensitivity to rejection because of
early experiences with a parent, a genetic predisposition, or both
(Bartz et al., 2011; Baumgartner et al., 2008).
Bargmann extended Insel’s work by identifying an amazing
signaling system inC. elegans that consists of one peptide, nem-
atocin. Nematocin, which is biochemically related to oxytocin
and vasopressin, disturbs not only the worms’ reproductive
behavior but simple sensory and motor behaviors as well.
From a detailed analysis of C. elegans’ behavior (Garrison
et al., 2012; Emmons, 2012), Bargmann has concluded that
oxytocin and vasopressin increase the coherence and coordi-
nated execution of mating behavior in worms. These findings
suggest that the brain has specific mechanisms designed to
promote positive social behavior. These mechanisms—which
appear in organisms separated by 600 million years of evolu-
tion—are remarkably well conserved. Moreover, manipulation
of the mechanisms can have a profound influence on social
behavior.
Robert Malenka of Stanford University and his colleagues
have taken a fresh look at positive group behavior (Do¨len et al.,
2013). They point out that even though social behavior promotes
group survival in species as diverse as worms, honeybees, and
humans, it nevertheless costs the individual effort and energy.
Social behavior must provide some reward to the individual or-
ganism, they reasoned: why else would it have been conserved
through evolution? They tested their idea in mice and found that
oxytocin modulates the release of serotonin into the nucleus
accumbens. Serotonin, a chemical that promotes feelings of
well-being, rewards the mice for positive social behavior. Thus,
the reinforcement of positive social interaction in mice requires
the coordinated activity of both oxytocin and serotonin.
Empathy: Mirror Neurons as Mediators of Social
Behavior
Giacomo Rizzolatti and his colleagues at the University of Parma
in Italy (Rizzolatti et al., 1996) discovered a network of neurons in
motor areas of the cortex of monkeys that mirror the actions of
others. These neurons respond similarly under two conditions:
when a monkey is performing an action and when the monkey
observes another monkey or a person performing the same ac-
tion. More recently, scientists have speculated that these mirror
neurons may explain some aspects of social behavior. If a per-
son is squinting his eyes and clenching his jaw, we automatically
sense that he must be feeling anger. If he smiles, we assume he
is happy. By mirroring his actions—the squinting eyes and
clenched jaw—in our own body, mirror neurons may enable us
to empathize with him and, by extension, to gauge his intentions.550 Neuron 80, October 30, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.Aggression
Aggression, like social behavior and fear, has been with us since
the dawn of time. It is highly conserved in evolution—nearly every
animal is capable of violence—yet we understand much less
about the anatomy of aggression than the anatomy of fear. Dar-
win believed it was possible to study aggression in animals, and
in 1928Walter Hess proved him right. Hess found that by electri-
cally stimulating certain areas in the hypothalamus of cats, he
could elicit attack behavior. David Anderson has returned to
the question recently (2012), usingmodern optogenetic methods
to study aggression in mice. He and his colleagues (Lin et al.,
2011) have identified neurons in a region of the hypothalamus
whose activity causes males to attack other males, females,
and even inanimate objects. These neurons receive signals
from the amygdala, which orchestrates aggression. Surprisingly,
20% of the neurons that are activated during attacks are also
active duringmating, and 20%of the neurons that are active dur-
ing mating are also active during attacks. This finding suggests
that the neurons responsible for these opposing social behaviors
reside in the same region of the brain.
Aggression has also been studied in fruit flies. Edward Kravitz
and his colleagues at Harvard have found that when flies grapple
with each other over a patch of food, they behave like sumo
wrestlers, pushing against each other to achieve dominance
(Chen et al., 2002). In fact, scientists have bred unusually
aggressive flies to produce a hyperaggressive strain. David
Anderson and colleagues have identified a sexually dimorphic
class of neurons in the fruit fly that controls aggressiveness in
males, but not in females (D. Anderson, personal communica-
tion). These neurons express the neuropeptide Substance P
(Tachykinin), which is thought to contribute to aggressiveness
in people. Interestingly, more than 60 years ago the ethologist
Nikolaas Tinbergen (1951) had observed that there exists a ten-
sion between sexual and aggressive instincts, and this led him to
make the prescient prediction that aggression is located in the
same region of the brain as that which controls mating behavior.
In his recent work, Anderson has shown that there is an overlap
of the neuroanatomical circuitries for aggression and mating in
mice and he has proposed that such overlap may account for
this tension. (Anderson, 2012; Lin et al., 2011). He has also
suggested that some forms of pathological violence in people
could reflect faulty circuit wiring of the human brain (see also
Frith, 2013).
The environment affects aggression in fruit flies almost as
much as genes do. A fly that is isolated at the pupa stage and
raised to adulthood in a vial is much more aggressive than flies
that have been housed in groups. This is true throughout the
animal kingdom—isolation breeds aggressiveness. The environ-
ment can also act by influencing the expression of genes. A
prime example of this effect can be seen in people who were
abused as children. A mutation in the gene monoamine oxidase
leads to an increase in the production of noradrenaline, a chem-
ical that predisposes people to aggression. The effect of the
mutation ismuchmore pronounced in peoplewhowere exposed
to trauma in childhood. Studies of hyperaggressive flies may one
day yield insights into how genes control aggression and into the
interaction between heredity and environment in producing
aggression.
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Making, and Personal Responsibility
Free Will and Personal Responsibility
The biological role of the unconscious in decision making was
explored in a simple experiment by Benjamin Libet at the Univer-
sity of California, San Francisco. Hans Helmut Kornhuber, a
German neurologist, had shown that when you initiate a volun-
tary movement, such as moving your hand, you produce a read-
iness potential, an electrical signal that can be detected on the
surface of your skull. The readiness potential appears a split sec-
ond before your actual movement. Libet carried this experiment
a step further. He asked people to consciously ‘‘will’’ a move-
ment and to note exactly when that willing occurred. He was
sure it would occur before the readiness potential, the signal
that activity had begun. What he found, to his surprise, was
that it occurred substantially after the readiness potential. In
fact, by averaging a number of trials, Libet could look into your
brain and tell that you were about to move before you yourself
were even aware of it. At first blush, this astonishing result sug-
gests that you have unconsciously decided to move before
being aware of having made the decision. In fact, however, the
activity in your brain precedes the decision to move, not the
movement itself. What Libet showed is that activity precedes
awareness, just as it precedes every action we take. We there-
fore have to refine our thinking about the nature of brain activity.
Decision Making
In the 1970s Daniel Kahneman and the late Amos Tversky began
to entertain the idea that intuitive thinking functions as an inter-
mediate step between perception and reasoning. They explored
how people make decisions and, in time, realized that uncon-
scious errors of reasoning greatly distort our judgment and influ-
ence our behavior. Their work became part of the framework for
the new field of behavioral economics, and in 2002 Kahneman
was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics. Tversky and Kahne-
man identified certain mental shortcuts that, while allowing for
speedy action, can result in suboptimal judgments. For example,
decision making is influenced by the way choices are described,
or ‘‘framed.’’ In framing, we weigh losses far more heavily than
equivalent gains. If a patient needs surgery, for instance, he is
far more likely to undergo the procedure if the surgeon says
that 90% of patients survive perfectly well, as opposed to saying
that 10% of patients die. The numbers are the same, but
because people are averse to risk, they much prefer to hear
that they have a high probability of living than that they have a
low probability of dying.
The issues of framing, bias, and rational decision making are
being explored with brain imaging by Raymond Dolan and his
colleagues (De Martino et al., 2006). They found that framing is
associated with activity in the amygdala, suggesting that
emotion plays a key role in decision bias. Moreover, activity in
the prefrontal cortex generally predicts less susceptibility to
the effects of framing. Kahneman and Tversky hold that there
are two general systems of thought. System 1 is largely uncon-
scious, fast, automatic, and intuitive—like the adaptive uncon-
scious, or what Walter Mischel, a leading cognitive psychologist,
calls ‘‘hot’’ thinking. In general, system 1 uses association and
metaphor to produce a quick rough draft of an answer to a prob-lem or situation. Kahneman argues that some of our most highly
skilled activities require large doses of intuition: playing chess at
a Masters level or appreciating social situations. But intuition is
prone to biases and errors. System 2, in contrast, is conscious-
ness-based, slow, deliberate, and analytical, like Mischel’s
‘‘cool’’ thinking. System 2 evaluates a situation using explicit
beliefs and a reasoned evaluation of alternatives. Kahneman
argues that we identify with system 2, the conscious, reasoning
self that makes choices and decides what to think about and
what to do, whereas actually our lives are guided by system 1.
Systems Biology of Decision Making
A clear example of the systems biology of decision making has
emerged from the study of unconscious emotion and conscious
feeling and their bodily expression. Until the end of the nine-
teenth century, emotion was thought to result from a particular
sequence of events: a person recognizes a frightening situation;
that recognition produces a conscious experience of fear in
the cerebral cortex; and the fear induces unconscious changes
in the body’s autonomic nervous system, leading to increased
heart rate, constricted blood vessels, increased blood pressure,
and moist palms. In 1884 William James turned this sequence of
events on its ear. James realized not only that the brain commu-
nicates with the body but, of equal importance, that the body
communicates with the brain. He proposed that our conscious
experience of emotion takes places after the body’s physiolog-
ical response. Thus, when we encounter a bear sitting in the
middle of our path we do not consciously evaluate the bear’s
ferocity and then feel afraid—we instinctively run away from it
and only later experience conscious fear. The development
of functional brain imaging in the 1990s confirmed James’ the-
ory. Using brain imaging, three independent research groups
(Damasio, 2012; Craig, 2009; Critchley et al., 2004) discovered
the anterior insular cortex, or insula, a little island in the cortex
located between the parietal and temporal lobes. The insula is
where our feelings are represented, our conscious awareness
of the body’s response to emotionally charged stimuli. The insula
not only evaluates and integrates the emotional or motivational
importance of these stimuli, it also coordinates external sensory
information and our internal motivational states. This conscious-
ness of bodily states is a measure of our emotional awareness of
self, the feeling that ‘‘I am.’’
Joseph LeDoux, a pioneer in the neurobiology of emotion,
found that the amygdala orchestrates emotion through its con-
nections with other regions of the brain (Ledoux, 1996). A stim-
ulus takes one of two routes to the amygdala. The first is a rapid,
direct pathway that processes unconscious sensory data and
automatically links the sensory aspects of an event together.
The second pathway sends information through several relays
in the cerebral cortex, including the insula, and may contribute
to the conscious processing of information. LeDoux argues
that together, the direct and indirect pathways mediate both
the immediate, unconscious response to a situation and the
later, conscious elaboration of it. With these studies, we are
now in a position to go beneath the surface of mental life and
begin to examine how conscious and unconscious experiences
are related. In fact, some of the most fascinating recent insights
into consciousness have come from studies that parallel James’
thinking and examine consciousness through its role in otherNeuron 80, October 30, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 551
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instance, show that just as the amygdala processes fear uncon-
sciously and consciously through separate pathways, the same
mechanisms in the hippocampus that are involved in the
conscious recall of explicit memory can also guide and bias
unconscious decisions (D. Shohamy, personal communication).
The Cell Biology of Decision Making
Following on the realization that biology is involved in decision
making and choice, neurobiology began to interact with eco-
nomics. Newsome and others are applying economic models
to their experiments on the cellular level in an effort to understand
the rules that govern decision making, while economists are
interested in incorporating the outcome of those studies into
their theories of economics. Neuroscientists are also making
good progress in studies of decision making by examining single
nerve cells in primates. A key finding, epitomized by the work of
Shadlen, is that neurons in the association areas of the cortex,
which are involved in decision making, have very different
response properties than neurons in the sensory areas of the
cortex. Sensory neurons respond to a current stimulus, whereas
association neurons are active longer, presumably because they
are part of themechanism that links perception with a provisional
plan for action. Shadlen’s results indicate that association neu-
rons accurately track the probabilities related to making a
choice. For example, as amonkey seesmore andmore evidence
indicating that a rightward target will dispense a reward, the neu-
ral activity that favors a rightward choice increases. This allows
the monkey to accumulate evidence and make a choice when
the probability of being correct passes some threshold, say
90%. The neurons’ activity and the decision they drive can occur
very rapidly—often in less than a second. Thus, under the right
circumstances, even rapid decisions can be made in nearly
optimal fashion. This may explain why the fast, unconscious,
system 1 mode of thinking has survived: it may be prone to error
under some circumstances, but it is highly adaptive under
others.
Child Development and the Ability to Delay Gratification
Resisting temptation in favor of long-term goals is an essential
component of social and cognitive development and of social
and economic gain. In a classic series of experiments in the
1960s and 1970s, Mischel set out to demonstrate the processes
that underlie self-control in preschool children (Mischel et al.,
2011). Four- and five-year-old children were given a treat and
told that if they waited a few minutes before eating it, they could
have a second treat. Each child waited in a bare room, with no
toys, books, or other distractions. Mischel’s experiment allowed
him to examine how the mental representation of the object of
desire—that is, themental image of two treats—enabled a young
child to wait 15 min in a barren room. But the most profound
result of his experiment was the strong correlation between the
amount of time a child could wait and how that child fared later
in life. By the time they reached age 16 or 17, the children who
could delay gratification had higher scores on the SAT test
than the children who could not wait, and they had greater social
and cognitive competence in adolescence, as rated by their par-
ents and teachers. At age 32, those who had delayed gratifica-
tion were less likely to be obese, to use cocaine or other drugs,
and so on.552 Neuron 80, October 30, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.Mischel also found he could teach children who could not
delay gratification how to improve. One of the simplest ways
was for the children to distract themselves from the object of
desire: a sort of ‘‘Get thee behind me, Satan’’ strategy. Another
way was for the child to pretend that the treat was just a picture:
‘‘Put a frame around it in your head,’’ Mischel urged. This finding
suggests that we might be able to help children learn how to
delay gratification and then explore whether those early training
experiences affect later performance on the SAT, the tendency
to use drugs, and so on.
In recent brain-imaging experiments carried out with B.J.
Casey, Mischel examined the original study participants and
found that the children who had a greater ability to delay gratifi-
cation had maintained that ability over 4 decades. The brains of
these middle-aged adults showed greater activity in prefrontal
cortex areas concerned with judgment, choice, and inhibition,
whereas those who showed less ability to delay gratification
had increased activity in the ventral striatum, which is linked to
desire, reward, and addiction (Casey et al., 2011).
Personal Responsibility and the Courtroom
DNA evidence has been in forensic use for decades. It was first
used in paternity cases to identify children’s fathers. Then, in
1986, police in England asked Alec Jeffreys, a molecular biolo-
gist, to use DNA evidence to evaluate the testimony of a 17-
year-old boy charged with raping and murdering two women.
The DNA evidence established the boy’s innocence and was
later used to convict the actual murderer. Following this impres-
sive beginning, DNA evidence underwent further extensive
scrutiny in the courtroom and is now generally admissible in
establishing guilt or innocence.
Today, there is great interest in using brain-based evidence in
criminal proceedings, with neuroscientists acting as expert wit-
nesses. This role is both important and problematic (for review,
see Jones et al., 2013). Brain imaging was first introduced into
the courtroom in 2006 in the case of Brian Dugan and has since
been used in over 30 cases. Dugan, then 52 years old, was tried
for the kidnapping and murder of a 10-year-old girl. His lawyer
used brain imaging to show that Dugan had an injury that
caused him to act psychopathically. (Psychopaths do not
exhibit increased activity in two particular regions of the cortex
when showed photographs of a moral violation; rather, they
show decreased activity.) Experts testified for and against the
validity of using brain imagining as evidence of culpability in
such a case. Ultimately, the jury voted unanimously for a death
sentence.
Similar issues of validity have arisen in regard to memory. The
legal system has been slow to adopt research findings from
cognitive psychological and neurological studies that question
not only the reliability of eyewitness testimony but also the mem-
ory of jurors. We now realize that memory is a reconstructive
process. It is susceptible to distortion and can be quite flawed
(Lacy and Stark, 2013). This has profound implications for how
much weight we must give eyewitness testimony in court, where
even minor memory distortion can have severe consequences.
In one experiment, for example, subjects mistakenly misidenti-
fied an individual as having committed a minor (staged) crime,
when in fact they had only seen that individual later, during the
(staged) investigation.
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in the courtroom for a PBS television program called ‘‘Brains
on Trial.’’ In the course of his work he spoke extensively with neu-
roscientists, lawyers, and judges and came away with two very
strong impressions. The first is that the new science of the
mind and its insights into brain function are generating a lot of
interest in the justice system, including the U.S. Supreme Court.
Attorneys are very interested in the fact that we can look into a
brain while it is recognizing a face, remembering a place, or
experiencing an emotion. As a result, some of them are saying
to themselves, ‘‘Well, why don’t we put the accused into an im-
aging machine and see if he really feels remorse, or if he is just
saying he feels remorse?’’ In fact, at least two companies claim
that they can use an MRI machine as a lie detector. Alda’s other
strong impression is that scientists are very reluctant to use im-
aging as evidence in a courtroom. The MRI is a relatively crude
measure of activity in whole areas of the brain, often on a rela-
tively crude spatial scale and almost invariably on a crude tem-
poral scale. The underlying mechanisms of brain activity—what
little we know about them—turn out to be far more diverse
than we originally thought. Moreover, many imaging studies do
not base their findings on individual brains; they are an average
of many people’s brains. For all these reasons, it is not possible
to look at activity in a person’s brain and see what he or she is
thinking.
Neuroscience as a forensic tool is in its infancy, but we can
imagine a time when some brain-based information will help
make decisions in the courtroom. For instance, some neurolog-
ical or psychiatric conditions may result in a brain that cannot
learn via the normal mechanisms of social reward and punish-
ment. Neuroscience might therefore be helpful in determining
when punishment for a criminal deed is an appropriate and effec-
tive solution and when it is not. While brain science may never be
in a position to assign responsibility or to determine guilt or inno-
cence, it may allow us to evaluate impulsiveness. That is, we
cannot tell whether someone is lying or telling the truth, but we
can gauge the degree of culpability or the likelihood of reliability.
This raises an even deeper question: Does explaining behavior in
neurological terms diminish culpability? Often, people worry that
explaining unacceptable behavior tends to excuse it. However,
most authors who have considered this subject agree that the
impact of an explanation depends on the nature of the explana-
tion. Thus, explaining the neural underpinnings of epilepsy would
tend to excuse actions committed during a seizure, but explain-
ing the neural underpinnings of greed would not excuse theft.
Neuroscience Links to the Perception of Art: The
Beholder’s Share
Brain science is likely to deepen our understanding of how we
enjoy music, literature, and visual art, and perhaps even how
we produce it. In turn, brain science will change as a result of
its involvement with the perception and creation of art. Under-
standing how our sensory systems process information is one
aspect of this change. A more complex one is understanding
our aesthetic response to art. In this Perspective I consider
only visual art. Thus the aesthetic question becomes, ‘‘Why do
two people look at the same image and one finds it beautiful
while the other finds it boring?’’ What is the nature of the be-holder’s response? Conceivably, the answers to these questions
could give us a handle on the basis of creativity as well.
The first person to attempt to connect art and science was
Alois Riegl (Riegl, 2000; Kemp, 2000), head of the Vienna School
of Art History and one of the most important art historians of
Vienna in 1900. Riegl emphasized an important psychological
aspect of art that we now consider obvious: namely, that art is
incomplete without the perceptual and emotional involvement
of the viewer. Not only does the viewer collaborate with the artist
in transforming a 2D image on a canvas into a 3D depiction of the
visual world, the viewer also interpretswhat he or she sees on the
canvas in personal terms, thereby addingmeaning to the picture.
Riegl called this phenomenon the beholder’s involvement.
The idea that art is not art without the viewer’s direct involve-
ment was elaborated by the next generation of Viennese art his-
torians, Ernst Kris and Ernst Gombrich (Kris, 1952; Gombrich,
1960, 1982). Drawing on ideas derived from Riegl and from
contemporary schools of perceptual and Gestalt psychology,
Kris and Gombrich devised a new approach to visual perception
and emotional response, and they incorporated that approach
into art criticism. Gombrich elaborated on Riegl’s idea of the
beholder’s involvement and called it the beholder’s share. Kris
argued that when an artist produces a powerful image out of
his own life experiences, the image is inherently ambiguous.
That ambiguity, in turn, elicits unconscious processes of recog-
nition in the viewer, who responds emotionally and empathically
to the image in terms of his or her own life experience. Thus, the
viewer undergoes a creative experience that, in a modest way,
parallels the artist’s own. Kris, and subsequently Gombrich,
intuited and elaborated on the idea of the brain as a creativity
machine. Gombrich realized that visual perception is only a spe-
cial case of a larger philosophical question: How can the real
world of physical objects be known through our senses (Berke-
ley, 1709; Gombrich, 1960, 1982)? The central problem of vision
is that we cannot know the material objects of the world per se,
only the light reflected off them. As a result, the 2D image pro-
jected onto our retina can never specify an actual 3D object.
This fact, and the difficulty it raises for understanding our percep-
tion of any image, is referred to as the inverse optics problem
(Albright, 2012; Purves and Lotto, 2010).
Even though there is not enough information in the image that
our eyes receive to reconstruct an object accurately, we do it all
the time. Clearly, our visual system must have evolved primarily
to solve this fundamental problem. How do we do it? von Helm-
holtz argued that we solve the inverse optics problem by
including two additional sources of information: bottom-up and
top-down information (see also Adelson, 1993). Bottom-up infor-
mation is supplied by computations that are inherent in the cir-
cuitry of our brain—we are born with them—and that enable us
to extract key elements of images in the physical world, such
as contours and junctions. These computations are governed
by a set of universal rules that have evolved from natural selec-
tion. As a result, even children as young as 1–2 years can inter-
pret images. Top-down information, in contrast, is supplied by
learning: the individual experiences, memories, and associations
that we bring to bear on every image, including a work of art.
Contemporary students of the inverse optics problem,
Yasushi Miyashita et al. (1998), Thomas Albright (2012), andNeuron 80, October 30, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 553
Figure 1. Flow Diagram of the Neural Circuit Involved in the Beholder’s Share (Kandel, 2012)
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activates particular neurons in the visual cortex and the medial
temporal lobe, thus creating a neural correlate of an image. Un-
der most conditions, the neural correlate resolves ambiguities in
the bottom-up signal and fills in missing information. As we have
seen, our brain does this largely unconsciously, on the basis of
probability. Thus, we see what is likely to be out there in the
world.
The Beholder’s Share and Face Recognition
As we look at a person, our brain is busy analyzing facial con-
tours, forming a representation of the face in our brain, analyzing
the body’s motion, forming a representation of the body, experi-
encing empathy, and forming a theory of the person’s mind.
These are all components of the beholder’s share, and modern
biologymakes it possible for us to begin to explore them. Figure 1
shows an initial, extremely simple approximation of the neural
circuit involved in the beholder’s share. It indicates seven points
of analysis along the circuit, as well as the components of the
beholder’s share and some of the areas of the brain involved in
each. Analysis of facial contours and the brain’s representation
of a face are clearly of central importance to the beholder’s
share. Fortunately, we have learned a great deal about the
psychology of face recognition and the biological processes
underlying it.
The Psychology of Face Recognition
Our brain is specialized to deal with faces. Indeed, face percep-
tion has evolved to occupy more space in our brain than any
other figural representation. As Darwin pointed out, the face
and the emotion it conveys are involved in nearly all human inter-
actions (Darwin 1871, 1872). We judge whether we trust people
or are scared of them in part by the facial expressions they show
us when we interact with them (Ekman, 1989). We are attracted
to people, of the same sex and the opposite sex, because of
their physical appearance and their facial expressions. We elect
people to public office based on assessments about their
competence that we infer from their faces (Todorov et al., 2005).
Face recognition is a difficult task for computers, but we can
recognize hundreds of faces effortlessly. Why? Because the
brain treats faces very differently from other objects. For one
thing, face recognition is uniquely sensitive to inversion. If we
were to turn a bottle of water upside down, we would still
recognize it as a bottle of water. However, we might not recog-
nize a face when it is upside down. Giuseppe Arcimboldo, a
sixteenth-century Milanese artist, illustrates this dramatically
by using fruits and vegetables to create faces in his paintings
(see also Kandel, 2012). When we view the paintings right-side554 Neuron 80, October 30, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.up, we readily recognize faces, but when the paintings are in-
verted, we typically recognize only bowls of fruits and vegetables
(Figure 2).
Not only do we have difficulty recognizing an inverted face,
we cannot under most circumstances recognize a change in
expression on an inverted face. If we view two images of the
Mona Lisa upside down (Figure 3), we may recognize both of
them as the Mona Lisa but not realize that they have different
expressions (Figure 4). With an object other than a face, we
would have spotted the difference (Thompson, 1980).
Biology and the Representation of Faces in the Brain
Scientists have learned an enormous amount about the repre-
sentation of faces in the brain from people who have face blind-
ness, or prosopagnosia. This condition results from damage to
the inferior temporal cortex, whether acquired or congenital.
About 10% of people have a modest degree of face blindness.
People with damage in the front of the inferior temporal cortex
can recognize a face as a face but cannot tell whose face it is.
People with damage to the back of the inferior temporal cortex
cannot see a face at all.
Studies in animals have also contributed to our understanding
of face recognition (Kobatake and Tanaka, 1994; Tsao et al.,
2008; Tsao and Livingstone, 2008). Figure 5 shows how a cell
in a monkey’s ‘‘face patch’’—a region of the brain that is special-
ized for face recognition—responds to various images. Not sur-
prisingly, the cell fires very nicely when the monkey is shown a
picture of another monkey (Figure 5A). The cell fires even more
dramatically in response to a cartoon face (Figure 5B): monkeys,
like people, respond more powerfully to cartoons than to real
objects because the features in a cartoon are exaggerated.
But a face has to be complete in order to elicit a response.
When the monkey is shown two eyes in a circle (Figure 5C), there
is no response. A mouth and no eyes elicits no response
(Figure 5D). There is also no response when the surrounding
circle is replaced with a square (Figure 5E). If shown only a circle,
there is no response either (Figure 5F). The cell only responds to
two eyes and amouth inside a circle (Figure 5G). If the circles and
the mouth are only outlined, there is no longer a response
(Figure 5H). In addition, if the monkey is shown an inverted
face, the cell does not respond (not shown).
Computer models of vision suggest that some facial features
are defined by contrast (Sinha et al., 2006). Eyes, for example,
tend to be darker than the forehead, regardless of lighting condi-
tions. Moreover, such contrast-defined features may signal the
brain that a face is present. To test these ideas in the cells of
the monkey’s face patch, Shay Ohayon, Freiwald, and Tsao
Figure 2. Giuseppe Arcimboldo, The Vegetable Gardener,
1587–1590
14.1 3 9.4 inches, oil on panel. Museo Civico Ala Ponzone, Cremona, Italy.
Figure 3. Inverted Images of da Vinci’s Mona Lisa
Adapted from Thomas, P. (1980). ‘‘Margaret Thatcher: A New Illusion.’’
Perception, 9: 483–484. p. 483, Figure 1.
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faces, each of whose features was assigned a unique luminous
value ranging from dark to bright. They then recorded the activity
of individual cells in the face patches in response to the artificial
faces and found that the cells do indeed respond to contrasts
between facial features. Ohayon and his colleagues later studied
the cells’ response to images of real faces and found that, again,responses increased with the number of contrast-defined fea-
tures. Tsao, Freiwald, and their colleagues had found earlier
that cells in the face patches respond selectively to the shape
of some facial features, such as noses and eyes (Tsao et al.,
2008). Ohayon’s findings now showed that this selective
response depends on luminance relative to other parts of the
face. Most of the cells they studied respond both to contrast
and to the shape of facial features, which leads us to an impor-
tant conclusion: contrast is useful for face detection, and shape
is useful for face recognition. These studies have shed new light
on the nature of the templates the brain uses to detect faces.
Behavioral studies suggest a powerful link between the brain’s
face detection machinery and the areas of the brain that control
attention, which may account for why faces—and particularly
portraits—draw our attention so strongly.
Neuroscience Links to Disorders of Mind: Psychiatry,
Psychoanalysis, and Psychotherapy
When psychoanalysis emerged from Vienna early in the twen-
tieth century, it represented a revolutionary way of thinking about
the human mind and its disorders. The excitement surrounding
the theory of unconscious mental processes increased as psy-
choanalysis was brought to the United States by immigrants
from Germany and Austria. Under the influence of psychoanaly-
sis, psychiatry was transformed in the decades following World
War II from an experimental medical discipline closely related
to neurology into a nonempirical specialty focused on psycho-
therapy. In the 1950s academic psychiatry abandoned some of
its roots in biology and experimental medicine and gradually
became a therapeutic discipline based on psychoanalytic
theory. Over the next 50 years, psychoanalysis exhausted
much of its novel investigative power. It also failed to submit
its assumptions to the sort of rigorous tests that are needed to
inspire confidence. Indeed, it was far better at generating ideas
than at testing them. Fortunately, some people in the psychoan-
alytic community thought that empirical research was essential
to the future of the discipline. Because of them, two trends
have gained momentum in the last several decades. One is the
insistence on evidence-based psychotherapy; the other is an
effort to align psychoanalysis with the emerging biology of mind.
Perhaps the most important driving force for evidence-based
therapy has been Aaron Beck, a psychoanalyst at the UniversityNeuron 80, October 30, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 555
Figure 4. Upright Images of da Vinci’s Mona Lisa
Adapted from Thomas, P. (1980). ‘‘Margaret Thatcher: A New Illusion.’’
Perception, 9: 483–484. p. 483, Figure 2.
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Perspectiveof Pennsylvania. Whereas traditional psychoanalysis teaches
that mental problems arise from unconscious conflicts, Beck
became convinced that conscious thought processes also play
a role in mental disorders. Beck found that cognitive style—a
person’s way of perceiving, representing, and thinking about
the world—is a key element in a number of disorders, including
depression, anxiety disorders, and obsessive-compulsive
states. He found that his depressed patients had a systematic
negative bias. They almost invariably had unrealistically high
expectations of themselves, put themselves down whenever
possible, and were pessimistic about their future. Beck
addressed these distorted negative beliefs and found that his
patients often improved with remarkable speed, feeling and
functioning better after a few sessions. This led him to develop
cognitive behavioral therapy, a systematic approach to therapy
that focuses on the patient’s cognitive style and distorted way
of thinking (Beck, 1995).
This systematic approach enabled Beck and others to study
the outcomes of treatments for depression empirically. Their
studies showed that cognitive behavioral therapy is as effective
as, or more effective than, antidepressant medication in treating
people with mild and moderate depression. It is less effective in
severe depression, but it acts synergistically with antidepres-
sants. Beck’s findings encouraged investigators to carry out
empirical outcome studies of psychoanalytically oriented insight
therapy, and some progress has been made in this area (Roose
et al., 2008; Shedler, 2010). In fact, a modest movement is now
afoot to develop biological means of testing specific aspects of
psychoanalytic theory and thus to link psychoanalysis to the
biology of the mind.
One reason we know so little about the biology of mental
illness is that we know little about the neural circuits that are
disturbed in psychiatric disorders; however, we are now begin-
ning to discern a complex neural circuit that becomes disordered
in depressive illnesses. Helen Mayberg, at Emory University, and
other scientists have used brain-scanning techniques to identify
several components of this circuit, two of which are particularly
important. One is Area 25 (the subcallosal cingulate region),
which mediates our autonomic and motor responses to
emotional stress; the other is the right anterior insula, a region
that becomes active during tasks that involve self-awareness
as well as tasks that involve interpersonal experience. These556 Neuron 80, October 30, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.two regions connect to other important regions of the brain, all
of which can be disturbed in depressive illness. In a recent study
of people with depression, Mayberg gave each person either
cognitive behavioral therapy or an antidepressant medication
(McGrath et al., 2013). She found that people who started
with less than average activity in the right anterior insula
responded well to cognitive behavioral therapy but not to the
antidepressant. People with greater than average baseline
activity responded to the antidepressant but not to cognitive
behavioral therapy. Mayberg could actually predict a depressed
person’s response to specific treatments from the baseline
activity in their right anterior insula. Although we need to figure
out what causes this differential baseline activity, the results
show us several important things about mental disorders. First,
the neural circuits that are disturbed are likely to be very com-
plex. Second, we can identify specific, measurable biological
markers of a mental disorder, and those biomarkers can predict
the outcome of two different treatments: psychotherapy and
medication. Third, psychotherapy is a biological treatment,
a brain therapy. It produces physical changes that can be
detected with brain imaging.
Genetics and Disorders of Mind
Any discussion of the biological basis of psychiatric disorders
must include genetics. We are beginning to fit new pieces into
the puzzle of how genetic mutations influence brain develop-
ment. Two recent findings are particularly important. Most muta-
tions produce small differences in our genes, but scientists have
recently discovered that some mutations give rise to structural
differences in our chromosomes. Such differences are known
as copy number variations. People with copy number variations
may be missing a small piece of DNA from a chromosome, or
they may have an extra piece of that DNA. Matthew State now
at the University of California, San Francisco, has discovered a
remarkable copy number variation involving chromosome 7
(Sanders et al., 2011). An extra copy of a particular segment of
this chromosome greatly increases the risk of autism, which is
characterized by social isolation. Yet the loss of that same
segment results in Williams Syndrome, a disorder characterized
by intense sociability. This single segment of chromosome 7
contains about 25 of the 21,000 or so genes in our genome,
yet an extra copy or a missing copy has profound, and radically
different, effects on social behavior.
The second new genetic finding is de novo point mutations.
These mutations arise spontaneously in the sperm of adult
men. Thus, a father can transmit a de novo point mutation to
one child without transmitting it to his other children or having
the mutation himself. Sperm divide every 15 days. This contin-
uous division and copying of DNA leads to errors, and the rate
of error increases significantly with age: a 20-year-old man will
have an average of 25 de novo point mutations in his sperm,
whereas a 40-year-old man will have 65. These mutations are
one of the reasons that older fathers are more likely to have chil-
dren with autism. Older fathers are also at greater risk of having
children with schizophrenia. Gulsuner and his colleagues identi-
fied 50 specific de novo mutations that occur in children who
develop schizophrenia but whose parents do not have the dis-
ease (Gulsuner et al., 2013). They then tracked those 50 mutant
genes to their locations on normal brain tissue ranging in age
Figure 5. Using a Visual Stimulus to Excite a
Single Cell in the Macaque Face Patch
Adapted from Kobatake, E., and Tanaka, K.
(1994). ‘‘Neuronal selectivities to complex object
features in the ventral visual pathway of the
macaque cerebral cortex.’’ J. Neurophysiol. 71,
856–2280. p. 859, Figure 4.
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genes form a network in the areas of the prefrontal cortex
that are involved in judgment and working memory. The network
influences three essential brain functions—the migration of
neurons during development, synaptic transmission, and the
regulation of gene transcription. This finding strengthens the
idea that genetic disruption of neurogenesis in the prefrontal
cortex is critical in the development of schizophrenia. These
advances in genetics research show us that mental disorders
are biological in nature and that our individual biology and
genetics contribute significantly to the development of them.
Ultimately, we need to understand how biological factors
interact with the environment to produce mental disorders.
Knowing Ourselves: A New Dialogue between Brain
Science, the Social Sciences, and the Humanities
Establishing and maintaining a dialog that includes brain sci-
ence, the social sciences, and the humanities will not beNeuron 80,easy. Important insights into the mind
have come from writers and poets as
well as from philosophers, psycholo-
gists, scientists, and artists. Each kind
of creative endeavor has made and will
continue to make contributions to our
conception of the mind. If we disregard
one in favor of another, that concep-
tion will be incomplete. Some human-
ists worry that biological analysis will
diminish our fascination with mental
activity or will trivialize important issues.
It is my strong belief that scientific con-
tributions to the humanities will not
trivialize the mind, but rather will illumi-
nate some of the most difficult ques-
tions about complex mental processes.
When we explain the machinery of the
brain, we don’t explain away creativity.
Nor do we explain away choice, volition,
or responsibility. Some worries are legit-
imate. Science that is done badly or is
interpreted uncritically can trivialize
both the brain and whatever aspect of
life it is trying to explain. Attributing love
simply to extra blood flow in a particular
part of the brain trivializes both love
and the brain. But if we could understand
the various aspects of love more fully
by seeing how they are manifested in
the brain and how they develop overtime, then our scientific insights would enrich our understanding
of both the brain and love.
Scientific analysis represents a move toward greater objectiv-
ity, a closer description of the actual nature of things. In the case
of visual art, science describes the observer’s view of an object
not only in terms of the subjective impressions it makes on the
senses, but also in terms of the brain’s physical mediation of
that impression. Art complements and enriches the science of
the mind. Neither approach can describe human experience
fully. What we require is interaction that encourages new ways
of thought, new directions, and new experimental approaches
in both art and the biology of the mind.
The relationships between psychology and brain science or
between art and the new science of the mind are evolving. We
have seen how the insights and methods of psychology have
been challenged—and often ratified—by brain science and
how expanded knowledge of brain function has benefited the
study of behavior. We have seen that our perception andOctober 30, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 557
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and we have examined a number of ways in which insights from
brain science enrich our discussion of art. We have also seen
how much brain science can gain from trying to explain the
beholder’s share.
Any grand vision of the unity of knowledge must be met with a
strong dose of historical reality. The gap that began to emerge
between the sciences and the humanities in the last century, first
described by C.P. Snow in his famous 1959 lecture ‘‘The Two
Cultures,’’ has not disappeared—and it is not likely to disappear
as an inevitable outcome of progress. Rather, we should
approach the ideal of unity by opening discussions between
restricted areas of knowledge. Dialogues are most likely to be
successful when fields of study are naturally allied, as are the
biology of themind and the perception of art, andwhen the goals
of the dialog are limited and benefit all of the fields that contribute
to it. It is very unlikely that a complete unification of aesthetics
and the biology of the mind will occur in the foreseeable future,
but it is quite likely that a new dialog between, say, aspects of
art and aspects of the science of perception and emotion will
continue to enlighten both fields and that in time the dialog
may well have cumulative effects.
The potential benefits for the new science of the mind are
obvious. One is that contact with disciplines in the humanities
is likely to yield new insights into the variety and purposes of
conscious and unconscious mental processes. Another benefit
is to understand how the brain responds to works of art, or
how we process unconscious and conscious perception,
emotion, and empathy. How might this dialog benefit artists?
Since the beginning of modern experimental science in the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, artists—from Filippo Brunelle-
schi and Masaccio to Albrecht Du¨rer and Pieter Bruegel to
Richard Serra and Damien Hirst—have been interested in
science. Leonardo da Vinci used his knowledge of anatomy to
depict the human form more compellingly and accurately than
any artist before him. So, too, contemporary artists may use
our understanding of the biology of perception and of emotional
and empathic response to create new art forms and other
expressions of creativity.
Thus, for the first time we are in a position to address directly
what neuroscientists can learn from the experiments of artists
and what artists and beholders can learn from neuroscience
about artistic creativity, ambiguity, and the perceptual and
emotional response of the viewer. Some artists who are intrigued
by the irrational workings of themind, such as Rene´ Magritte and
other surrealists, have already created a new art form, relying on
introspection to infer what was happening in their own minds.
While introspection is helpful and necessary, it cannot provide
a detailed understanding of the brain and its workings. Artists
today can enhance traditional introspection with a knowledge
of how aspects of our mind work.
We have seen in this essay four specific areas in which the new
science of the mind is particularly well positioned to enrich our
understanding of other areas of knowledge. We have seen its
potential as an intellectual force and a font of new knowledge
that is likely to bring about a new dialog between the natural sci-
ences, the social sciences, and the humanities. This dialog could
help us understand better themechanisms in the brain that make558 Neuron 80, October 30, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.creativity possible, whether in art, the sciences, or the human-
ities, and thus open up a new dimension in intellectual history.
In addition, an enriched understanding of the brain is needed
to guide public policy. Particularly promising areas are the cogni-
tive and emotional development of infants, the improvement of
teaching methods, and the evaluation of decisions. But perhaps
the greatest consequence for public policy is the impact that
brain science and its engagement with other disciplines is likely
to have on the structure of the social universe as we know it.
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